United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres addresses a General Assembly meeting marking the UN’s 80th anniversary, reflecting on the institution’s future. Eight decades after its founding, the United Nations faces a moment of reckoning. The world of 2025 is grappling with overlapping crises – from wars in Ukraine and Gaza to a warming planet – that test the UN’s core mission “to maintain international peace and security” and promote human rights and development[1]. As UN leaders and member states commemorate the UN’s 80th anniversary, they are also asking tough questions about the organization’s fitness for purpose in a rapidly changing global landscape[2]. The UN80 Initiative launched by Secretary-General António Guterres in early 2025 epitomizes this introspection, aiming to “streamline operations, sharpen impact, and reaffirm the UN’s relevance” for the future[3]. In this context, it is crucial to assess the UN’s current state – its financial and political strains, the performance of key agencies, and the possibilities for reform and renewal – especially through a risk governance lens that considers the UN’s capacity to confront systemic risks and global shocks.
Financial and Political Challenges Facing the UN
The United Nations of 2025 confronts severe financial shortfalls and political headwinds that threaten to undermine its work. A budgetary crisis has been brewing for years and is now acute. Member states’ failures to pay their assessed contributions have led to a cash crunch in the UN’s regular budget. As of April 2025, unpaid dues to the core UN budget totaled approximately $2.4 billion, with the United States alone owing about $1.5 billion in arrears[4]. Other major contributors – including China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia – have also accumulated significant unpaid assessments[4]. This funding gap has forced the UN into drastic belt-tightening. The Secretary-General’s team warns that UN-wide resources could shrink by up to 30% in 2025 compared to 2023, potentially reducing or cutting off aid to tens of millions of people[5][6]. Indeed, the UN Secretariat has drawn up plans to trim its $3.7 billion administrative budget by 20% for 2026 – implying roughly 6,900 job cuts from an international civil service of 35,000[7]. These austerity measures, part of the UN80 reform agenda, reflect a somber reality: the UN is being asked to “do less with less” in the words of one expert[8], even as global needs grow.
Several factors drive this financial crisis. In some cases it is deliberate political choice: for example, the United States – traditionally the UN’s largest funder – has periodically withheld or cut funding to UN agencies over political disagreements[9]. Under the Trump administration, Washington froze contributions to entities like UNRWA (the UN’s Palestinian refugee agency) and pulled out of bodies such as UNESCO, the Human Rights Council, and the WHO[9]. Although the U.S. later restored some support, the specter of major donors retreating has shaken confidence in the UN’s financial stability. More broadly, geopolitical tensions are eroding trust in multilateralism. The Security Council’s paralysis in the face of major conflicts – often due to vetoes by rival great powers – has become emblematic of political gridlock[10]. “When the P5 agree, the Security Council possesses almost unlimited authority… But when they disagree, the Council is generally paralyzed,” observers note[11]. The Ukraine war, for instance, has seen repeated vetoes and deadlock, leaving the Council largely sidelined. This institutional impotence in peace and security feeds a wider crisis of confidence. According to one analysis, “Security Council paralysis, resentment over inequalities of privilege, unfulfilled expectations on climate change and debt… all contribute to a sense of a bloated organization that has lost its way.”[12] Many developing countries perceive the UN-centered order as inequitable – reflecting post-1945 power structures rather than 2025 realities – and are frustrated by the lack of progress on issues like climate justice and debt relief[12].
Internally, the UN also faces bureaucratic and structural challenges that hamper effectiveness. Over 4,000 separate mandate documents have accumulated over the decades, resulting in more than 40,000 discrete mandates for the UN system[13]. Many programs overlap or lack clear sunset clauses, leading to duplication and “mission creep.” For example, there are three different UN agencies focused on food and agriculture, and parallel agencies for refugees (UNHCR) and migration (IOM) that have “a huge amount of overlap” in practice[14]. Such fragmentation not only wastes resources but also makes the UN less agile in responding to crises. Secretary-General Guterres’s reform team candidly acknowledges that the UN suffers from “bureaucratic bloat and slow decision-making,” exacerbated by a cumbersome 193-member governance structure[14]. All these issues – financial squeeze, great-power rivalry, and internal incoherence – form a perfect storm just as global crises demand a nimble and well-resourced UN. The stage is set for a tough debate on how to revitalize the UN’s credibility, legitimacy, and capacity to deliver.
Institutional Performance Across the UN System
Despite these headwinds, the broader UN system – from the Security Council to specialized agencies – continues to play a pivotal role in global governance. However, each part of the system has faced its own performance tests in recent years. Key bodies such as the Security Council, the World Health Organization (WHO), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) illustrate both the UN’s indispensable contributions and the areas where it has struggled or must adapt.
UN Security Council: Deadlock and Demands for Reform
The UN Security Council remains the premier global body for maintaining peace and security, but in 2025 it is widely seen as struggling – even “woefully underperforming” in the eyes of many member states. The Council has had successes over the decades (for instance, authorizing peacekeeping missions or sanctions that helped stabilize conflicts), but in the current geopolitical climate it is often paralyzed on the biggest crises. In the ongoing war in Ukraine, the Council has been effectively neutered: Russia’s veto power as a Permanent Member (P5) prevents any binding action or even formal condemnation of its invasion. Similarly, on the Israel-Palestine conflict – including a devastating new war in Gaza – the Council’s responses have been hindered by divisions among major powers[15][12]. This repeated P5 veto usage in situations of mass atrocities or major war has reinforced perceptions that the Council’s decision-making is neither effective nor reflective of today’s realities[10]. As one expert summarized, when the great powers disagree, the Council is “generally paralyzed,” leaving global security challenges unaddressed by the UN’s most powerful organ[11].
This underperformance has intensified calls for Security Council reform at the UN’s 80th anniversary. Leaders from across Africa, Asia, and Latin America have argued that the Council’s composition – still the P5 of 1945 (US, Russia, China, Britain, France) plus 10 rotating members – is outdated and undermines the UN’s legitimacy. They note that entire continents like Africa and Latin America have no permanent seat or veto, and that emerging powers like India and Brazil remain outside the P5 club. In the General Assembly’s high-level debate in 2025, many heads of state urged making the UN “more just and effective” by expanding Security Council membership and improving representation and accountability[16]. The UN80 discussions themselves have acknowledged these political demands: a Nigerian foreign policy expert wrote that the Global South seeks “seats on the Security Council [and] equitable, shared, and rules-based global governance”, but the current UN80 reform proposals “do not address” those deep-seated issues[17]. In response, there is growing momentum in the General Assembly to at least revitalize negotiations on Council reform, which have languished for years. Some observers suggest that the 80th anniversary could be a catalyst for a breakthrough – for example, by agreeing in principle to add new permanent members (with or without veto power) or giving greater voice to the African Union in the Council’s work[17]. Still, any change requires the agreement of the current P5, each of whom wields a veto on charter amendments – a high hurdle. In the meantime, the wider UN membership has tried to work around the Council’s paralysis. The General Assembly has invoked the “Uniting for Peace” mechanism to hold emergency sessions on Ukraine and other crises, and in 2022 it adopted a resolution (championed by Liechtenstein) requiring any P5 member that vetoes a resolution to come before the Assembly to explain itself[18]. While this doesn’t strip the veto, it at least increases transparency and pressure. Such steps reflect a collective impatience for a more effective multilateral security system. The Council at 80 is thus at a crossroads: either it finds ways to reform and act more credibly, or it risks a slow erosion of authority as frustrated states seek alternatives to the UN for conflict management.
World Health Organization (WHO): Pandemic Lessons and Global Health Security
The World Health Organization, arguably the most prominent UN specialized agency, entered the 2020s in the eye of the storm. The COVID-19 pandemic was the biggest test of the WHO in generations – exposing both its strengths (as a hub for scientific information and coordination) and its weaknesses (limited powers and resources, and political pressures from member states). In the pandemic’s initial phase, the WHO faced criticism for slow responses and for deference to major powers, but over time it led initiatives that delivered results, such as the global COVAX program for vaccine distribution. By 2025, the WHO has been working to implement the hard lessons learned from COVID-19. Most significantly, the world’s governments have come together to negotiate a new Pandemic Agreement under WHO auspices, aimed at strengthening prevention, preparedness and response for future global health emergencies. In May 2025, at the World Health Assembly in Geneva, all 194 WHO member states formally adopted by consensus the first-ever Pandemic Accord[19]. This landmark agreement – the product of three years of negotiations – represents a commitment to ensure that “the world is safer… and more equitable in response to future pandemics.”[20] “The world is safer today thanks to the leadership, collaboration and commitment of our Member States to adopt the historic WHO Pandemic Agreement,” declared WHO Director-General Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus upon its adoption[21]. The accord sets out principles and tools to bolster the global health security architecture: for example, it seeks to guarantee timely and equitable access to vaccines, treatments, and diagnostics during outbreaks, so that poorer countries aren’t left at the back of the queue[22][23]. It also provides for better international coordination of responses and data-sharing, and it launches efforts to establish a pathogen-sharing system and a global supply network for health emergencies[24][25]. Importantly, to address concerns about sovereignty, the agreement explicitly notes that it does not give WHO authority to override national public health measures – a reassurance to skeptics who feared a “supranational” WHO mandate[26].
The Pandemic Agreement, while hailed as a breakthrough for multilateralism, will take time to come into force – it requires ratification by national parliaments and at least 60 countries to formally adopt it[27]. Critics also note it lacks a dedicated financing mechanism for pandemic response and robust enforcement provisions[28][29]. Nonetheless, it is a major achievement that reinforces the WHO’s central role in global health governance. Beyond pandemic preparedness, the WHO in 2025 continues to tackle multiple ongoing health crises. From outbreaks of Ebola and Marburg virus, to the spread of dengue, cholera, and other infectious diseases exacerbated by climate change, the WHO’s emergency teams are stretched thin. Chronic challenges like non-communicable diseases and mental health also demand attention. The agency’s work has been hampered in the past by financial constraints – over 80% of its budget comes from voluntary contributions (often earmarked by donors for specific projects) rather than stable assessed dues. There is an effort underway to gradually increase assessed contributions so that by 2028 they make up half of the WHO budget, improving sustainability. Still, funding remains a concern: as global economic pressures mount, some major donors have tightened their belts. The WHO also had to navigate political minefields – for instance, the U.S. withdrawal from the organization in 2020 (under President Trump) and re-entry in 2021 (under President Biden) showed how geopolitical swings can buffet global health efforts[9]. In 2025, with U.S. elections looming and polarized politics, the WHO watches warily for any renewed politicization of its funding or authority.
On the positive side, WHO-led initiatives continue to save lives daily. The drive to achieve universal health coverage (UHC) by 2030 has seen progress in many countries, though a gap of 4.5 billion people still lacking essential health services persists globally[30]. The WHO’s campaigns have virtually eradicated polio (just a handful of cases remain in two countries) and it convenes research and response networks for threats like avian influenza and the new challenges of long COVID. The organization is also adapting by embracing a “One Health” approach (linking human, animal, and environmental health) to preempt zoonotic pandemics, and by integrating lessons of community engagement from COVID-19. Overall, the WHO in 2025 exemplifies both the potential and the limits of UN agencies: it has unparalleled convening power and expertise, but it relies on member states’ political and financial support to be effective. The new pandemic treaty, if implemented, could significantly reinforce global health governance – but success will depend on countries honoring their commitments and investing in health systems resilience, from the local level up.
UN Development Programme (UNDP): Development Setbacks and the SDG Imperative
The UN Development Programme is the UN’s lead agency on the ground in promoting sustainable development, advising on governance, and coordinating development assistance in about 170 countries. As such, UNDP is at the forefront of efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – the UN’s ambitious agenda to end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure prosperity for all by 2030. Midway to 2030, however, the world is far off-track on the SDGs, and UNDP’s work has become more challenging than ever. A succession of global shocks – the COVID-19 pandemic, worldwide economic disruptions, rising debt burdens, and intensifying climate disasters – have reversed hard-won development gains in many places. For the first time in over three decades, global human development indices actually declined for two years in a row (2020 and 2021), a backslide UNDP called a shock to the system. Although there has been some rebound, progress remains sluggish and uneven. According to UN assessments, only about 17% of SDG targets are currently on track globally – nearly half of all targets show merely minimal progress, and over one-third have seen no progress or even regression below the 2015 baseline[31][32]. At the current pace, many goals – from ending extreme poverty to achieving gender equality – will not be met even by 2050, let alone 2030[33][34]. For instance, extreme poverty is now projected to still afflict 575 million people in 2030, and some 600 million people may remain undernourished by that date if trends do not improve[35][36]. These sobering statistics have injected urgency into UNDP’s mission to “rescue” the SDGs in the remaining years of the Agenda 2030 timeframe.
UNDP’s performance must be viewed in the context of these global headwinds. The agency has pivoted to help countries respond to overlapping crises: supporting vaccine rollouts and social protection during the pandemic, advising governments on debt management and economic recovery, and aiding communities to rebuild after conflicts or disasters. In countries like Sudan, Yemen, Afghanistan, and others, UNDP often works in tandem with humanitarian actors to sustain livelihoods and basic services even amid instability. A signature UNDP initiative has been the “SDG Push” – an integrated approach using data and systems analysis to identify policy accelerators for SDG progress in each country. By 2025, UNDP has rolled out SDG Push diagnostics in over 90 countries to help them target interventions that yield multiple benefits across goals[37][38]. For example, investing in girls’ education and clean energy can simultaneously reduce poverty, improve health, and cut carbon emissions. UNDP Administrator Achim Steiner emphasizes the need for “transformation at scale”, calling for investments in resilience, green economies, and digital innovation to break through stagnation[39]. UNDP also leads the UN’s Climate Promise (supporting over 100 countries to enhance their climate action plans under the Paris Agreement) and has been active in crisis prevention, from deploying conflict analysts in volatile regions to assisting governments with anti-corruption and inclusive governance reforms.
Despite these efforts, UNDP and the UN development system face serious constraints. A major challenge is financing: global official development assistance (ODA) has not risen to the trillions needed for the SDGs, and in some cases donor budgets are shifting from long-term development to short-term humanitarian relief or domestic priorities. The SDG financing gap in developing countries is estimated at a staggering $4 trillion per year[40]. UNDP’s own funding is a mix of a relatively small core budget (contributed by donor governments voluntarily) and much larger earmarked funds for specific projects. When donor countries face economic strain or political shifts, UNDP’s funding can fluctuate. In 2023–2024, multiple crises and tighter aid budgets meant that some UNDP programs (especially in middle-income countries) struggled for resources. UNDP has been advocating innovative finance – like blended public-private investments and debt swaps for SDG investments – to supplement traditional aid. Politically, the development agenda has also been competing with geopolitical tensions for attention at the global level. The 2023 SDG Summit (a mid-point review during UNGA) yielded a recommitment by leaders to the Goals, but concrete financing commitments were limited. As part of the broader UN reforms, there have been proposals to restructure parts of the development system for greater efficiency. Notably, the UN80 leaked reform memo in 2025 suggested merging UNDP with the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) to streamline operations[41]. It also floated merging the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) with UN Women, and even “sunsetting” UNAIDS (whose HIV/AIDS mandate would be folded into WHO)[41]. While these ideas are still under discussion (and controversial among stakeholders), they reflect a push to reduce fragmentation and overhead in the development pillar.
From a risk governance perspective, UNDP’s role is crucial in building long-term resilience. Development programs that reduce poverty, improve education and health, and strengthen institutions all make societies less vulnerable to shocks. UNDP has increasingly focused on “risk-informed development”, helping countries integrate climate and disaster risk considerations into planning. For example, UNDP supports the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction at national levels, in close collaboration with UNDRR, and promotes adaptive social safety nets that can expand in response to crises. However, the sheer scale of systemic risks like climate change can outpace incremental development gains. UNDP’s 2022 Human Development Report warned of a new uncertainty complex – involving economic, environmental, and geopolitical risks – that could unsettle development for years to come. The coming five years are pivotal: if the world can mobilize investments (such as the proposed $500 billion annual SDG Stimulus advocated by the UN) and embrace bold policy changes, there is still hope to meet key targets. If not, UNDP and its partners will face an increasingly uphill battle to simply prevent backsliding on basic human development indicators, let alone achieve the grand vision of the Global Goals.
UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR): Rising Threats, Falling Behind?
The UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) is a smaller entity in the UN system, but it has a big mandate: to coordinate and advocate for reducing disaster risks worldwide. In an age of “polycrises” – where climate change, environmental degradation, and socio-economic fragilities intermix – UNDRR’s mission of enhancing risk governance is more important than ever. The world has seen a stark rise in natural hazards and climate-related disasters. Current projections indicate that the number of disasters per year could increase by 40% between 2015 and 2030, due to climate change, ecosystem stress, and greater exposure of populations[42]. Already, extreme weather events (mega-fires, heatwaves, hurricanes, floods) are breaking records with alarming frequency, and slow-onset crises like droughts are fueling food insecurity and displacement. UNDRR’s flagship Global Assessment Reports have characterized this as entering an era of “systemic risk”: disasters are not isolated events but symptoms of how global systems (environmental, economic, social) are interlinked and vulnerable. For example, a local virus outbreak can trigger a global pandemic and economic shock, or a drought can spark conflicts over resources. These complex, cascading risks demand a fundamentally more integrated approach to resilience – which is what UNDRR has been urging through frameworks like the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015–2030).
At the midpoint of the Sendai Framework, a high-level UN review in 2023 found mixed progress. On the one hand, more than 100 countries have established national DRR strategies and improved early warning systems (in line with Target E of Sendai). Initiatives such as the UN’s Early Warnings for All campaign (launched by Guterres in 2022) aim to ensure every person on Earth is protected by early warning networks by 2027. On the other hand, the loss of life and economic damage from disasters remain unacceptably high, and in many regions losses are increasing – meaning we are still investing more in responding to disasters than preventing them. UNDRR has highlighted chronic underinvestment in disaster prevention and climate adaptation. Shockingly, Least Developed Countries suffer disaster mortality rates that are 170% higher than the global average[43], yet they receive only a fraction of international financing for resilience. Furthermore, UNDRR emphasizes that risk is becoming more concentrated: rapid urbanization, for instance, has created megacities where a single hazard event could impact tens of millions. The COVID-19 pandemic also laid bare gaps in risk governance beyond the traditional “natural disaster” realm – showing the need for better preparedness for biological, technological, and other novel hazards.
Within the UN system, UNDRR works to break the silos that often separate humanitarian response, development work, and climate action. There is now broad agreement on the concept of the “humanitarian-development-peace nexus” – the idea that these actors must collaborate to address root causes of crises and build resilience. Yet translating this into practice is difficult. In the UN80 reform context, observers noted that while cross-pillar collaboration is championed in theory, the actual reform proposals so far offer “little in the way of ideas to link up the UN’s humanitarian work with other parts of the organization.”[44] For example, a bolder step could have been to merge OCHA (the UN’s humanitarian coordination office) with the Development Coordination Office that guides UN country teams, creating a unified strategy for both emergency relief and long-term risk reduction[45]. Such integration was not pursued, however. UNDRR continues to push for whole-of-society and whole-of-government approaches to risk: strengthening national and local disaster management agencies, promoting risk-informed urban planning, and engaging the private sector (since economic losses from disasters hit businesses and infrastructure). Success stories do exist – countries that invested in cyclone shelters and evacuation planning, for instance, have sharply reduced deaths from cyclones compared to past decades. But global progress is uneven and overall insufficient given the projected scale of “planetary shocks” on the horizon.
One critical aspect of risk governance is financing for resilience. In 2023, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on a new “Disaster Risk Reduction financing strategy”, urging international financial institutions and donors to integrate disaster risk into development financing. UNDRR championed the concept of “pre-arranged disaster finance” – mechanisms like insurance, contingency funds, and cat bonds that ensure rapid payout when a shock hits, thereby preventing development setbacks. There’s also movement on addressing the “loss and damage” from climate impacts, exemplified by the establishment of a Loss and Damage Fund at the 2023 UN climate conference, which the UN system will likely help operationalize. From a performance standpoint, UNDRR itself operates with a modest budget (tens of millions, a drop in the bucket of UN funding) and relies on advocacy and partnerships to leverage change. It convenes the biennial Global Platform for DRR – in 2025, this global gathering (hosted in Bali, Indonesia) brought thousands of practitioners together and issued a call for a “radical shift from managing disasters to managing risk every day.” The Global Platform highlighted areas like extreme heat (a silent killer now receiving more attention) and disaster displacement, urging better planning for climate-induced migration[46].
In summary, UNDRR’s performance is measured less in direct operations (it doesn’t field large response teams) and more in how it influences mindsets and policies. By that measure, progress is incremental: more governments acknowledge the need for preventive action and the systemic nature of risk, but the world is still creating risks faster than it is reducing them. As the climate crisis accelerates and new threats emerge (from cyber disruptions to environmental collapse), the UN’s capacity to anticipate and mitigate risks will be paramount. UNDRR provides the playbook – the Sendai Framework and related guidelines – but implementation falls to political leaders and communities on the ground. With five years left in the framework, a major push is on to get disaster risk reduction back on track, or the 2030 goal of substantial reductions in losses will be missed. The UN’s credibility will increasingly rest on whether it can help shield vulnerable populations from the “new normal” of recurring shocks. In that sense, UNDRR’s mandate cuts to the heart of the UN’s promise: to save succeeding generations not just from the scourge of war, but from hazards that can be foreseen and must be prevented.
The UN80 Initiative: Reforming the UN for a New Era
Recognizing these multifaceted challenges, Secretary-General Guterres has launched the UN80 Initiative in 2025 as a comprehensive reform drive tied to the UN’s 80th anniversary. This initiative is essentially a blueprint for institutional renewal – “a system-wide push to streamline operations, sharpen impact, and reaffirm the UN’s relevance for a rapidly changing world”[3]. It builds on earlier reforms (such as the UN@75 Declaration and the Our Common Agenda report of 2021) but comes at a time of particularly acute stress for the UN. As Guterres put it, “the world is not what it was in 1945… change is inevitable”, and the UN must adapt or risk obsolescence[2]. The UN80 effort has been spearheaded by a high-level Task Force (chaired by Deputy SG Amina Mohammed and UN veteran Guy Ryder) and organized around three workstreams: (1) Efficiency & Effectiveness – cutting bureaucratic fat and relocating resources for better impact; (2) Mandate Review – examining the thousands of mandates to prune outdated or redundant tasks; and (3) Structural Changes – exploring deeper reorganization of the UN system’s programs and entities[47].
In September 2025, Guterres released a major report titled “Shifting Paradigms: United to Deliver”, which lays out the initial recommendations across the UN’s four pillars (peace & security, humanitarian, development, human rights)[48]. While he portrayed them as “initial steps towards a genuine paradigm shift,” many observers note that the proposals are relatively cautious – “far from the bold, visionary overhaul” that some had hoped for[49]. Key elements of UN80’s reform plan include:
- Budget Discipline and Downsizing: To address the financial crunch, the UN80 plan calls for significant cost-cutting. The UN Secretariat – the administrative backbone – is slated to reduce staffing by 20% and cut its budget by a similar proportion by 2026[7]. This translates to eliminating thousands of posts and scaling back certain activities. Guterres argues this is about removing duplication and focusing on priority needs, but staff and some member states worry about capacity loss. Indeed, UN officials admit the goal may ultimately be “shrinking the United Nations” and “doing less with less.”[8] The initiative stresses, however, that it’s “reform, not retrenchment”, aiming for smarter use of funds rather than simply slashing vital programs[50][51]. Guy Ryder from the UN80 Task Force has emphasized relocating functions to cheaper locations (e.g. moving more posts from New York/Geneva to field duty stations like Nairobi) as a way to save money and bring the UN closer to the people it serves[52][53].
- Consolidating Overlapping Agencies: Perhaps the most controversial ideas are those to merge or realign parts of the UN system that have overlapping mandates. A leaked UN80 Task Force memo in mid-2025 listed over 50 such suggestions[54]. For example, it floated combining the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) – which oversees climate negotiations – with the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), effectively integrating climate change work with broader environmental efforts[55]. Another proposal is to integrate UNAIDS into the World Health Organization (ending UNAIDS as a standalone program)[56]. In the human rights arena, the memo suggests consolidating several bodies into a single human rights agency[56] – potentially merging the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights with various specialized mandates, to strengthen coherence. Within the development pillar, as noted, the report recommends merging UNDP with UNOPS (the project services office) and merging UNFPA with UN Women, as well as winding down UNAIDS entirely[41]. And under peace and security, it envisions further integrating the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) with the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) – a process already begun in earlier reforms – and eliminating some duplicate offices. For instance, a notable proposal is to dismantle the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) in DPO; its units for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform, and justice would move under a new Centre of Excellence on Prevention, Peacebuilding and Peace Support (an expanded Peacebuilding Support Office), while other components like UN Police and Mine Action would remain in DPO but report directly to the peace operations chief[57][58]. This change is intended to streamline and better link conflict management from prevention through post-conflict transitions, which analysts consider a sound move[59]. Another peace/security reform is establishing a centralized Women, Peace and Security (WPS) center in the UN – an idea endorsed by experts since 2017 but never implemented due to internal resistance[60]. UN80 finally recommends doing this, to unify and elevate the UN’s WPS agenda in partnership with UN Women[60].
- Operational Changes and Field Focus: The UN80 plan also includes practical management fixes. It proposes combining certain regional coordination offices and envoy roles, which could eliminate a few high-level posts (for example, merging the assistant secretary-general positions for the Americas, Europe, and Asia-Pacific with the Middle East, and similarly merging two Africa regional ASG positions)[61]. Because these were already joint DPPA/DPO roles, this mainly trims duplication at headquarters, cutting two ASG jobs[61]. In the field, the plan suggests merging or co-locating small mission offices that overlap – for instance, uniting the UN special political mission in Hodeidah, Yemen with the Special Envoy’s office there, or consolidating the UN’s political office in Cyprus with the long-running UNFICYP peacekeeping mission[62]. Such steps aim to “simplify operations” and ensure a leaner presence on the ground. The broader ethos is to make the UN more “field-focused, lean and agile”, shedding some of the heavy bureaucracy in New York[63][64].
- New Compacts and Coordination Mechanisms: In areas where outright mergers proved too controversial, UN80 opts for improved coordination. For example, rather than merging all humanitarian agencies (a leaked idea was to create a single “UN Humanitarian Operations Department” uniting WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, etc.[65][66]), the final proposal shied away from that. It instead offers a “New Humanitarian Compact” – described as a six-step blueprint to deliver faster, more accountable aid, rebuild trust in multilateral relief, and “maximize impact from every dollar.”[67][68] This compact focuses on practical efficiencies like joint procurement (indeed WFP and UNICEF announced they will merge their supply chains for certain goods to avoid competing and driving up prices)[69]. It also emphasizes aligning humanitarian, development, and peace efforts – though critics note it stops short of structural integration across the nexus[44]. In the human rights pillar, the report suggests creating a new high-level Human Rights Group (bringing together heads of agencies) to better coordinate protection of civilians and human rights across the system[70]. Some analysts argue a more radical step would be to streamline the plethora of UN special representatives on different human rights issues by folding their roles into the main human rights office (OHCHR), which would both save money and reduce fragmentation[70]. However, such streamlining was not explicitly proposed in this round.
The reception of UN80’s proposals has been mixed. Many member states, especially major donors, support the focus on efficiency and see it as long overdue. They have been frustrated by overlapping mandates and what they view as UN bureaucracy growing without sufficient results. For them, the idea of “reviewing 4,000 mandates” with the help of AI to identify redundancies is welcome[13]. They also like the emphasis on accountability and impact on the ground[71][52]. However, developing countries and UN staff unions have raised concerns. A key worry is that budget cuts and mergers might disproportionately hit areas like development and human rights that are already chronically under-funded[72]. Indeed, an analysis by the International Service for Human Rights found the human rights pillar could face disproportionate cuts under the revised 2026 budget, even though it receives under 5% of the UN budget to begin with[73][74]. There is skepticism over whether this reform is truly about making the UN fit-for-purpose, or if it’s simply a “cost-saving exercise” driven by donor austerity (some diplomats privately dub UN80 “the great UN haircut”). Guy Ryder counters that the aim is not downsizing for its own sake, but he admits that the UN must align its ambitions with the reality of resources[50][51]. Political pushback is also expected: as one expert noted, “you can’t imagine a worse time to plan major reforms than when the leaders of China, Russia, and the U.S. are at each other’s throats”[75]. Heightened big-power rivalry means consensus on bold changes is elusive. Some reforms might be implementable by the Secretary-General under his own authority (administrative reorganizations, etc.), but others will need General Assembly or even Security Council approval. Guterres faces a narrow window – his term ends in December 2026 – to institutionalize these changes. It’s uncertain if his successor (to be selected in 2026) will carry the torch or chart a new course[76][77].
Civil society voices and independent analysts caution that UN80 doesn’t tackle some core issues of UN legitimacy. For example, Global South countries have long demanded a greater say in global economic governance – reforms to the IMF/World Bank system, more concessional funding, technology transfer, etc. While UN80 acknowledges imbalances (noting that the global financial system still reflects 1945 power distributions and often fails the poorest[78]), its mandate is mostly inward-looking at UN institutions rather than fixing the broader system. Likewise, Security Council reform – the elephant in the room – is not part of UN80’s remit, since that involves charter change beyond the SG’s authority. As a result, some fear that UN80 could end up “avoiding meaningfully challenging the system’s architecture,” much like past reform efforts that tweaked around the edges[79]. The humanitarian expert Damian Lilly pointed out that almost every past humanitarian reform review concluded failure was due to not addressing structural problems, and warns UN80 may repeat that pattern if it sticks to voluntary coordination improvements instead of true mergers or shifts of power[80][81]. He characterizes the New Humanitarian Compact as “more cosmetic than substantive… a smokescreen for avoiding more fundamental reform.”[69]
On the other hand, UN80 is still a work in progress, and some bolder ideas may yet emerge. Guterres deliberately kept some “big ideas” under wraps initially, to negotiate quietly and avoid premature pushback[82][83]. As UNGA debates the 2026 budget – which will incorporate UN80 changes – there is an opportunity for member states to amend or build on the proposals[84]. Developing countries, which make up the majority in the General Assembly, hold critical votes and can make their voices heard[17][85]. If enough states insist on protecting certain programs or demand more ambition (e.g. in the development pillar), the reform package could be adjusted. For example, Africa and the G77 might endorse relocating more UN offices to the Global South (as Guterres hinted by citing Nairobi as a potential hub)[86], as that brings jobs and influence to their regions. But they will resist any moves that cut country-level development support. The negotiations around UN80 thus will be a balancing act: support for the UN paired with a push for change, as experts predict the tone will be[82]. By late 2025, it’s clear that UN80 is not a done deal – Guterres “is going to face real political opposition” and the outcome is uncertain[87]. Nevertheless, the very existence of this reform drive reflects a broad recognition that the UN at 80 cannot simply continue with business as usual. The liquidity crisis and the clamor for a more effective UN have converged to make reform both an urgent necessity and, perhaps, a possibility.
Reinventing Global Governance: Proposals and Prospects for Renewal
The UN80 initiative is one piece of a larger puzzle – the quest to update the international system to better cope with the challenges of the 21st century. As the United Nations reaches its octogenarian milestone, numerous international proposals and debates are underway about reinventing or reinforcing the UN’s role in global governance. These range from long-standing issues of legitimacy and representation (e.g. Security Council reform, greater voice for developing nations) to new ideas for tackling emerging global risks (e.g. frameworks for climate, cyberspace, and public health). Here we outline some of the major avenues of reform and renewal being discussed as of late 2025:
- Security Council Expansion and Veto Restraint: As noted, there is widespread agreement that the Security Council’s composition must change to reflect today’s geopolitical realities. The G4 countries (India, Brazil, Germany, Japan) continue to campaign for permanent seats, and the African Union demands at least two permanent seats for Africa (echoing the Ezulwini Consensus). During the UN’s 80th session, leaders from the U.S., France, UK have (to varying degrees) endorsed the idea of adding new permanent members, including representation for Africa[16]. The U.S., for instance, has publicly supported the inclusion of India and Germany, and at times Brazil and Japan, as well as an African presence. China and Russia say they support greater representation for the Global South, but they have been non-committal on specific candidates and wish to preserve the P5’s prerogatives. Meanwhile, over 100 member states back the France-Mexico initiative and the ACT Code of Conduct on veto restraint – pledges that P5 members voluntarily refrain from using the veto in cases of mass atrocities. Though these are not legally binding, three P5 members (UK, France, US) have signaled some openness to the principle in extreme cases, whereas Russia and China remain opposed. A proposal floating in academic circles is for the General Assembly to demand the Security Council recommend multiple names for Secretary-General (rather than one) so the Assembly can make a real choice[18][88]. This would slightly shift the power balance in selecting the UN’s leader and make the process more transparent, although it would still require Council consensus on nominees. All told, formal Security Council reform remains difficult – any charter amendment needs 2/3 of the Assembly and ratification by all P5 – but the political pressure for it at UN80 is the highest in decades. Even if immediate reform is unlikely, the legitimacy debate is forcing the P5 to justify their privilege and perhaps seek informal ways to be more inclusive (e.g. inviting more non-members to participate on specific issues, as was done in climate security discussions).
- Summit of the Future and the Pact for Global Cooperation: In parallel to UN80’s internal reform focus, member states have been working on a forward-looking agenda through the proposed Summit of the Future, scheduled originally for 2024 (postponed from 2023) as a high-level meeting to reinvigorate multilateralism. In the fall of 2024, just ahead of the UN’s 80th birthday, governments convened in New York for what resulted in the adoption of a “Pact for the Future”[89]. This Pact, hailed by some as a major achievement, is essentially a political declaration renewing commitment to global cooperation and addressing gaps in global governance. As one observer framed it, the Pact is full of lofty “what we need to do” commitments, whereas UN80 is about “how the UN can deliver” on those commitments[90]. Key elements coming out of the Summit of the Future process include: a proposed Declaration on Future Generations (to ensure long-term thinking in UN decisions), agreement to establish a UN Futures Lab (to scan for emerging risks and trends), consensus on a Global Digital Compact (setting principles for digital governance, data protection, and AI ethics under the UN’s aegis), and a New Agenda for Peace (a blueprint issued by Guterres on reimagining peace and security, including preventing nuclear proliferation, regulating new weapons technologies, and boosting conflict prevention)[63][64]. The Pact for the Future also underscored the need to modernize the global financial architecture – complementing parallel efforts in forums like the G20 to reform multilateral development banks and international debt relief mechanisms. For instance, the Compromiso de Sevilla (Commitment of Seville) was launched in 2025 as a renewed global framework for financing sustainable development[91]. This initiative, supported by the UN, aims to revamp how development projects are funded, leveraging public, private, and innovative financing to meet the SDGs. It is a response to the chronic funding gap and is meant to work in synergy with World Bank reforms and initiatives like the Bridgetown Agenda for climate finance. By highlighting these global deals – “a renewed financing framework and a pandemic accord” – proponents argue the UN is showing it can still deliver solutions to world problems[92][93].
- Strengthening Risk Governance and Emergency Response: A notable proposal from the Our Common Agenda report and subsequent discussions is to create a “UN Emergency Platform.” This would be a mechanism the Secretary-General can activate in the face of complex global crises that require urgent, coordinated action beyond the scope of any one agency or country. For example, if another pandemic strikes, or a climate-related catastrophe with worldwide ripple effects (imagine a cyberattack that collapses global financial systems, or a supervolcano eruption), the Emergency Platform would rally key stakeholders – not just UN agencies, but also international financial institutions, regional organizations, the private sector, and civil society – in a joint response under UN auspices. While member states have conceptually endorsed this idea, the details are being ironed out (questions of duration, leadership, and mandate of such a platform). The broader principle is to make the UN the center of a networked, multi-stakeholder response to global shocks, leveraging its convening power. This reflects the Secretary-General’s vision of “networked and inclusive multilateralism,” where the UN works as part of a web of institutions and actors[94]. Another related initiative is the appointment of a Special Envoy for Future Generations and establishing mechanisms to hear from youth and civil society on long-term risks. All of this is meant to overcome the short-termism and silo-mentality in current global governance.
- Engaging New Stakeholders and Improving Representation: Outside formal intergovernmental reform, there’s a push to broaden the UN’s inclusivity. This includes ideas like creating a UN Parliamentary Assembly or Network (to give parliamentarians a voice in UN affairs and inject more democratic accountability) – an idea supported by dozens of legislatures worldwide, though not yet officially endorsed by the UN. The UN has, however, boosted the role of civil society and youth: a UN Youth Office was established in 2023 to amplify youth participation, and the General Assembly has been seeking ways to enable systematic input from civil society organizations in its work. At UN80, some suggest institutionalizing a “People’s Forum” or digital platform where global citizens’ perspectives can feed into UN debates. While such proposals remain nascent, they tie into the legitimacy debate: if the UN is seen as too much a club of governments (some of them autocratic), its moral authority suffers. Greater transparency (like public hearings of Secretary-General candidates, which began in 2016) and inclusion of non-state actors are ways to renew the UN’s legitimacy for a new era[95][96].
- Linking Climate and Security, and Other Cross-Cutting Agendas: The climate crisis is forcing innovations in global governance. The Security Council has debated climate security – whether it should treat climate change as part of its mandate – but consensus is elusive (Russia and others have been resistant). Instead, ad hoc coalitions have formed: for instance, a Climate Security Mechanism inside the UN now coordinates analysis between UNDP, DPPA, and UNEP. Countries are also exploring legal avenues like the International Court of Justice: in 2023 the UNGA requested an ICJ advisory opinion on states’ obligations to combat climate change, which could influence future climate justice claims. Another cross-cutting issue is global health beyond pandemics: some have floated creating a permanent UN entity for health emergencies (a bit like how the UN created UNAIDS for HIV in the ’90s), but with the pandemic treaty in place, that may be unnecessary if WHO is strengthened. Cyber governance is another frontier – discussions under the UN on norms for state behavior in cyberspace have inched forward (an Open-Ended Working Group has been meeting), but big power divisions persist. The proposed Global Digital Compact in 2024 aimed to set some basic principles on digital connectivity, data rights, and AI governance; by 2025, follow-up is underway to implement those principles via forums like the Internet Governance Forum and possibly new regulatory frameworks. Ensuring the UN stays relevant in these emerging domains is part of the renewal agenda.
Looking at all these initiatives, one can see a common thread: the recognition that the UN must evolve to address global systemic risks and provide global public goods in a world far different from 1945. Issues such as climate change, pandemics, financial instability, cyber threats, and large-scale migration cannot be managed by single nations – they require cooperative action and effective international institutions. Yet the current multilateral system often operates in silos and can be undercut by nationalistic politics. The risk governance lens highlights that global challenges are interconnected – a climate shock can fuel conflicts and pandemics can exacerbate inequality – so the responses must be interconnected too. The UN is often the only platform with universal legitimacy that can convene all nations to forge common strategies (as it did with the Paris Agreement on climate and now the Pandemic Agreement)[97][98]. Even the UN’s harshest critics usually concede that if the UN didn’t exist, we would need to invent something like it for today’s globalized risks.
Still, time is of the essence. A recent think tank report warned that the UN is at a “moment of reckoning” – if it fails to reform, it risks sliding into irrelevance as new groupings and powers take over problem-solving[99][100]. We already see some signs: ad hoc coalitions (like the G20, climate clubs, regional organizations) taking initiatives when UN forums are stalemated. For the UN to remain the cornerstone of global governance, it must prove it can overcome its internal divisions and deliver concrete results for peoples and the planet. The period from now to 2030 will be critical. The world faces a narrow window to avoid catastrophic climate change, to meet the SDGs, and to regulate technologies that could pose existential threats. A revitalized UN – one that is more representative, better financed, and more agile – could be the linchpin of a safer, more equitable international order. The ongoing proposals for reform and the political energy around the UN’s 80th anniversary give a glimmer of hope that the international community understands what’s at stake.
Conclusion: Navigating an Uncertain Future
As the United Nations turns 80 in October 2025, it stands at a crossroads between past achievements and future uncertainties. On one hand, the UN’s track record includes remarkable successes: it helped eradicate smallpox globally, forged landmark treaties like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and coordinated humanitarian aid and peacekeeping in countless crises[97][101]. The very fact that virtually every nation is part of this universal body is testament to a shared belief – however tenuous at times – in dialogue and cooperation. On the other hand, the UN is facing perhaps its greatest crisis of confidence since its founding. The world’s most powerful nations are at odds, straining the Security Council’s ability to act[102]. Transnational threats like climate change and pandemics are outpacing the collective response. Internally, bureaucratic inertia and resource constraints hamper the UN system’s agility. Critiques of the UN as “bloated” or “out of touch” have grown louder[12].
Yet, the very magnitude of today’s global risks underscores why a functional UN is more necessary than ever. No country, no matter how powerful, can singlehandedly manage a climate catastrophe, a viral outbreak that jumps continents, or a cascade of financial failures spilling across borders. Either humanity hangs together through multilateral institutions, or we risk hanging separately in the face of systemic shocks. This reality has prompted the current flurry of reform efforts – from UN80’s internal shake-up to the broader Summit of the Future agenda – all seeking to “reverse the decline in finances and perceptions about UN effectiveness.”[103] There is an acknowledgment that defending the status quo is not sufficient; the UN must “accept doing less with less” in some areas while concentrating efforts on what delivers impact[104]. It must also craft a compelling new narrative about its value, as Guterres has tried to do by articulating a vision of a UN that is more nimble, inclusive, and focused on the global common good[105].
The coming years will test whether member states can move from rhetoric to action on UN renewal. Will they pay their dues and invest in the UN system’s solvency? Will they compromise on expanding the Security Council or reforming its working methods for greater legitimacy? Will they empower the UN with the tools (and trust) to coordinate responses to planetary emergencies? Encouraging signs include the adoption of the Pandemic Agreement – showing that consensus is possible on complex issues when there is political will[21][106]. Likewise, the rallying of 193 countries around the SDG Summit in 2023 and the Pact for the Future in 2024 indicates a shared recognition that “we must strengthen multilateral cooperation or risk chaos.” But follow-through is everything. As one commentary wryly noted, world leaders often praise the UN in general while undermining it in particular – supporting the idea of the UN, except when it constrains their own interests[12][107]. Overcoming this paradox will require leadership, trust-building, and perhaps a new generation of statesmen and women who see beyond zero-sum nationalism.
In the final analysis, the UN’s ability to address systemic risks and cross-border crises will be a key yardstick of its relevance. Initiatives like boosting disaster preparedness, fostering peace in conflict hotspots, and coordinating climate action all show the UN trying to position itself as “the pivot of global risk governance.” But it will continually be challenged – by great-power politics, by resource scarcities, and by crises that test the limits of its capacity. The UN at 80 is not the same institution as at its birth: it has grown, evolved, stumbled, and learned. If it is to make it to 100 and still matter, the reforms and debates happening now must translate into a UN that is more just, more effective, and more accountable to the people it serves. As an African proverb popular in UN circles goes: “If you want to go fast, go alone. If you want to go far, go together.” The United Nations is where the world attempts to go together – and in an era of converging global risks, we will either go far together, or not at all.
Sources:
- CFR – Council on Foreign Relations (2025). “The UN80 Initiative: What to Know About the United Nations’ Reform Plan.”[10][4][9][7][55][8][11][75]
- IISD – International Institute for Sustainable Development (2025). “UNGA80: What is UN80 and key issues to watch.”[2][78][47][13][89]
- WEF – World Economic Forum (2025). “The UN is marking its 80th anniversary with a plan for change.”[3][50][51][97][93]
- IPI Global Observatory (2025). Damian Lilly, “One Compact Too Far: UN80 and the Humanitarian Reform Malaise.”[67][80][65][42][69][44][99]
- IPI Global Observatory (2025). Jenna Russo, “The UN80 Proposals on Peace and Security: Not the Overhaul We Need.”[49][57][60][61][94]
- UNDRR / Global Humanitarian Overview data (2023/2024). Disaster risk projections and humanitarian funding trends.[42][108]
- PAHO/WHO News (20 May 2025). “World Health Assembly adopts historic Pandemic Agreement.”[21][22][26][27]
- Security Council Report / PassBlue (2025). Calls from member states for a more effective, representative UN at 80.[17][16]
[1] [3] [50] [51] [91] [92] [93] [97] [98] [101] The UN is marking its 80th birthday with a plan for change | World Economic Forum
[2] [13] [47] [52] [53] [78] [89] [90] UNGA80: What is UN80 and key issues to watch | International Institute for Sustainable Development
[4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [14] [15] [17] [54] [55] [56] [71] [72] [75] [76] [77] [82] [83] [84] [85] [86] [87] [102] The UN80 Initiative: What to Know About the United Nations’ Reform Plan | Council on Foreign Relations
[12] [18] [88] [95] [96] [103] [104] [105] [107] What’s at stake at UNGA 2025? | Brookings
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/whats-at-stake-at-unga-2025/
[16] At 80, United Nations Must Be More Just, Effective, Leaders Tell …
[19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [106] World Health Assembly adopts historic Pandemic Agreement to make the world more equitable and safer from future pandemics – PAHO/WHO | Pan American Health Organization
[28] The pandemic treaty: a milestone, but with persistent concerns
[29] The Pandemic Agreement may weaken, rather than strengthen …
[30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [43] SDG Push | UNDP
[41] [42] [44] [45] [65] [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] [79] [80] [81] [99] [100] [108] One Compact Too Far: UN80 and the Humanitarian Reform Malaise – IPI Global Observatory
[46] IOM Engagement at Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction 2025
[48] [49] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] [63] [64] [94] The UN80 Proposals on Peace and Security: Not the Overhaul We Need – IPI Global Observatory
[73] [74] UN80 Initiative: proposed budget cuts disproportionately hit the …